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What Have You Done
for Me Lately?
Does when we
Long ago, I worked in a small
o r g a n i z at io n t h at ( p r og r e s sively, for the time) sought the
input of subordinates, including
me, on the performance of our
managers. Although I was really
young and not thinking this way
at the time, I am now convinced
that my manager went out of his
way to be kind and ingratiate
himself with me and fellow subordinates, but only around
the time of the annual performance review. Why?
I think the manager may have had an appreciation for the
well-known compensation problem of evaluators placing
undue weight on the most recent performance. If this
manager was particularly kind to us just before we filled
out our surveys, maybe we would evaluate him higher.
This has me thinking more about pay for performance
incentives and the timing of that performance. Do some
occupations or pay plans create incentives to strategically
time your best performance? What problems does that create?

perform well have an

impact on our pay?

Kevin F. Hallock, Ph.D.
Donald C. Opatrny ’74 Chair,
Department of Economics
Cornell University
Joseph R. Rich ’80 Professor,
Departments of Economics and HR Studies
Cornell University
Director,
Institute for Compensation Studies,
Cornell University
Board Member,
WorldatWork Society of Certified Professionals

Major League Baseball and
Performance in a Contract Year
One set of occupations for which there is a lot of anecdotal
evidence and volumes of discussion regarding performance
timing is professional athletics. In “The Dynamics of
Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball
Long-Term Contracts,” ( Journal of Sports Economics, 10(1),
February 2009, 6-21), Anthony C. Krautmann and John L.
Solow considered the case of professional baseball players
who have contracts for a set number of years. In particular,
they examined the performance of players over the entire
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span of their contracts and investigated (among
other issues) the incentive to perform well to
land a better next contract versus the disincentive effects of a fixed contract coming to an
end. They were careful to control for statistical
issues that may cloud the results (such as the
chances that a given contract is likely the last
one for the player). Among their findings were
that players who are less likely to sign an additional contract have a substantial reduction
in performance, relative to what is predicted
based on their characteristics. In other words,
having a contract with an impending end date
and no contract renewal worsens the player’s
performance. Krautmann and Solow, however,
also found evidence that players they predict
to sign another contract only perform about
as well as expected, neither improving nor
worsening their predicted performance.

If an employee has met
his/her quarterly target,
he/she may hold back
additional sales until the
next quarter in hopes of
working toward the next
quarterly bonus.

Executive Pay and the
Timing of Performance
Salespeople who have (say, quarterly) bonus opportunities
may have the incentive to move sales from one period to the
other. For example, if an employee has met his/her quarterly
bonus target, he/she may hold back additional sales until the
next quarter in hopes of working toward the next quarterly
bonus. And that may not be optimal for the organization.
But, what about those at the top of the management
pyramid? I wrote a paper with Paul Oyer (Stanford Business
School) called “The Timeliness of Performance Information in Determining Executive Compensation,” ( Journal
of Corporate Finance, 1999, 5(4), 303-321) for which we
studied the relationship between firm performance and CEO
pay. Our interest: “Do corporate boards consider smoothly
performance throughout the year or do they concentrate
more on CEO/firm performance just prior to their compensation decisions?” This is a question directly related to my
manager so long ago and to professional athletes.
Based on a sample of a few thousand executives, we found
something consistent with the “contract-year performanceshift” idea. That is, we found evidence of a stronger link
between CEO pay and the firm’s sales revenue in the fourth
fiscal quarter than in the other three quarters. In other
words, CEOs may have some financial incentive to shift
sales closer to the timing of the board’s compensation decision. However, questions remain, such as: Is there a good
reason for a board to put extra weight on the CEO’s most
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recent performance, or is performance pay creating some
net negative outcome for shareholders?

Timing Going Forward
There certainly is plenty of evidence across a set of industries that the timing of performance can have real effects on
the compensation of employees. To the extent that this gives
employees (athletes, salespeople, executives and others)
incentives to shift the timing of effort in ways that may not
be in the best interests of the employer, shareholders and
other constituents is certainly something worth thinking
about if we want to better curb such unwelcome gaming.
For me, because annual reviews at Cornell are done around
now and I am the chair of a large department, I am now
thinking about whether and how this timing of performance
issue could be hitting home within my own organization.
Are you wondering the same?
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